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What substance use in pregnancy can lend to an ethics of 
accompaniment 
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Abstract 
Theoretical work in critical medical anthropology and biomedicine on substance use in 
pregnancy has yet to develop a cohesive framework of the maternal-fetal unit (MFU) as a 
dynamic object. As a result, patient history, risk, and agency continue to be driven by an 
Enlightenment-era, monolithic conception of individual will. I use the example of Carla, a 
young woman actively using heroin in her pregnancy, to illustrate the limits of the MFU as it 
is currently conceived. By using critiques of subjective utilitiarianism, as discussed by Byron 
Good, and the concept of becoming, as elucidated by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, this 
article seeks to articulate an ethics of accompaniment, focused on both individual patient 
care and wider sociopolitical advocacy. These ethics help to redefine the MFU, and support 
new and unique ways of providing services to this often marginalized and vulnerable 
population. 
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Make maps, not photos or drawings. 
– Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
A Thousand Plateaus (1987, 24–25) 
Clinical epistemology: From critical medical anthropology to 
physician advocacy in the care of substance use in pregnancy 
The importance of anthropological theory in biomedical practice has been a topic of 
discussion over the past three decades (see, for example, Christman and Johnson 1996; 
Kleinman 1985; Kleinman and Benson 2006). This discourse has created an epistemological 
space within biomedicine in which to focus on the social and political construction of care, 
particularly among marginalized and vulnerable populations. The effect of critical medical 
anthropology – particularly its primary engagement with biomedical institutions’ power and 
control – on clinical practice has been felt in a variety of ways, from HIV/AIDS care in 
Haiti (Farmer 1992) to understanding chronic illness and pain among migrant farmworkers 
in the United States (Holmes 2013). 
In particular, the role of the physician as a ‘public citizen’, engaged in the care of an entire 
community, rather than only an individual, sheds a new light on the ethical requirements of 
biomedical care (Gruen, Pearson, and Brennan 2004). Physician advocacy, defined as ‘action 
by a physician to promote those social, economic, educational, and political changes that 
ameliorate the suffering and threats to human health and wellbeing that he or she identifies 
through his or her professional work and expertise’ (Earnest, Wong, and Federico 2010, 63), 
is a direct response to the ethical obligations of a physician as a public citizen. Indeed, in line 
with critical medical anthropology’s goals for creating a new medical order committed to 
understanding and undoing inequality as experienced through health disparities, physician 
advocacy takes up this torch on a political, educational, and clinical level (see Metzl and 
Hansen 2014). Moving towards ‘viable institutional practices’ (Quesada, Hart, and Bourgois 
2011, 351) created by structurally competent physicians requires a new form of ethics and 
new theoretical objects to think with in the clinical encounter. These challenges set the stage 
for clinically evaluating patients living at the margins of care, particularly those who 
challenge everyday notions of morality and agency.  
In the world of obstetrics, one particular figure emerges: the substance-using, pregnant 
patient. In this essay, I introduce Carla1 – a pregnant woman using substances who was 
 
1 All names and locations have been changed in order to protect participants’ confidentiality. 
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evaluated in the antepartum service of a major hospital in the northeastern United States. 
Through her narrative, I discuss the maternal-fetal unit (MFU) as a biosocial object to think 
with in a clinical setting, particularly in relation to the ethical and biomedical concerns 
surrounding substance use in pregnancy.2 I then elaborate on the particular events 
surrounding Carla’s presentation to the hospital for initiation of methadone maintenance in 
the setting of sexual assault; in particular, how risk, agency, and medical history were 
structured to impact the moral deservingness of her care (Viladrich 2012; Willen 2012).3 
Finally, I turn to the construction of an ethics of accompaniment4 – informed by critiques of 
agency by Byron Good and discussions of becoming by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari – 
that redefine how a patient’s medical history, and therefore agency, is viewed in relation to 
the MFU.  
Introducing Carla 
I met Carla in her antepartum room during my fourth year as a medical student. As a sub-
intern at a large county hospital in the northeastern United States, I spent a majority of my 
day taking care of pregnant women admitted to the hospital for a multitude of fetal and 
maternal medical issues. Many of the women I helped to care for, under the tutelage of an 
obstetrics and gynecology (OB/GYN) resident, were admitted for safe transition from 
intravenous, nasal, or oral use of nonprescribed opiates to synthetic opiates, such as 
methadone or buprenorphine.5 Carla’s initial story was similar to many women I had seen in 
 
2  As opposed to Paul Rabinow’s (1996) discussion of biosociality as the use of disease to create new 
social groupings or self-perceptions, I use ‘biosocial’ in this essay along the lines of Bridget Hanna 
and Arthur Kleinman (2014, 17): ‘A biosocial approach posits that such biologic and clinical 
processes are influenced by society, political economy, history, and culture and are best understood as 
interactions of biological and social processes’. 
3  For the purposes of this paper, I use the term ‘agency’ to describe the ability of a pregnant woman to 
make decisions about her life, her health, and her fetus’s well being. Though this definition is limited 
in scope, it stems directly from discussions surrounding moral pioneering, described by Rayna Rapp 
(2000, 2011) in the context of amniocentesis and genetic testing, and further elaborations regarding 
its social construction (see Gammeltoft 2007). 
4  I thank one of the anonymous reviewers of this text for coining this phrase. 
5  Concomitant with an inpatient admission for titration, such patients would be regularly visited by 
obstetricians who specialize in the care of women with substance abuse issues, social workers, and 
psychiatrists. In the outpatient setting, these women are also continually managed by a 
multidisciplinary care team in order to continue synthetic opioids. They are further subjected to urine 
toxicology screenings to assess for adherence and the use of other substances. These tests would be 
used by different bureaucratic agencies, such as Child Protection Services, in their determination of 
women’s fitness to parent and to keep custody after birth (Child Welfare Information Gateway 2012).  
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the past: she professed a desire to ‘get clean’ during pregnancy after a long history of using 
narcotics. 
Talking to her in her sparsely furnished room, Carla positioned herself upright in her bed, 
untangling the loose IV lines from the edge of her bedrail. The multiple rings on her fingers 
clacked gently on her meal table as she spoke. She looked frail and unkempt, with her short, 
dirty blond hair left uncombed, and her bony frame swimming under the large, white 
hospital gown. I sat in a chair at her bedside, doing an initial evaluation to understand her 
history, medical condition, and what brought her in to the hospital.  
Carla detailed a long history of abusing oral and intravenous narcotics with intermittent 
cocaine use, gesturing to the multiple scars on her arms when she would discuss any aspect 
of her drug use. She did not state when she started using heroin, her drug of choice, but told 
me that she began using oxycodone from a local dealer over the past few years. I directly 
asked her about whether she had exchanged sex for money or drugs, and she told me that 
she never engaged in this behavior. She denied having ever attempted to maintain sobriety 
through the use of methadone or buprenorphine; however, she was sometimes off of 
substances for periods of days to weeks while trying to coordinate easy access to both 
money and housing. Both unemployed and homeless, Carla had been living outdoors in 
different parks and highway underpasses on the outskirts of the city. Most recently, she was 
sleeping on one of her close friend’s couches. She had not been in the shelter system in the 
city, and when pressed, did not give any reason as to why she had not reached out to these 
programs. 
Carla’s pregnancy was not her first, and like her others, it was unplanned, though extremely 
desired. She was unsure about the timing of her last menstrual period, but felt that she might 
have been about four to five months pregnant. The father of the baby was not currently 
involved in her day-to-day life. She had little to say about him, except that he was not 
supportive of her and that he was also actively using heroin. Her previous viable pregnancies 
had ended with normal vaginal deliveries. However, due to her active substance use during 
those pregnancies, CPS was involved and acquired custody of her children. Eventually, the 
children were placed in her parents’ care; they were located in another part of the state. She 
told us that she was unable to go to see them due to problems in accessing transportation.  
Carla fit into the category of women predominantly seen at the hospital: poor, unemployed, 
homeless, and actively using substances. Her admission for methadone titration was seen as 
a way to mitigate the multiple risks to both herself and her fetus brought on by her 
substance use. However, these clinical concerns, and the subsequent care provided to Carla, 
bring up important questions about the science of substance use in pregnancy and the 
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conception of the MFU. Turning to the MFU as an object to think with regarding substance 
use in pregnancy, I argue that Carla’s story introduces important questions about agency, 
patient history, and risk that are rooted in a static theory of the MFU. By reconceiving the 
MFU as a dynamic entity, Carla’s narrative can take on new meaning within the clinical 
encounter. 
Substance abuse in pregnancy: Putting the ‘M’ back in the MFU 
The MFU is understood by scholars through a variety of lenses, primarily via qualitative 
understandings of new technologies geared at improving overall fetal and neonatal health. 
Whether through studying amniocentesis (Rapp 2000, 2011), fetal ultrasound imaging 
(Gammeltoft 2007), or assisted-reproductive technologies (Inhorn, Shrivastav, and Patrizio 
2012), the anthropology of reproduction has examined biomedical practices to chart the 
construction of both the mother and the fetus. Couched within these analyses is how 
obstetrics as a field, directly or indirectly, dictates a woman’s given role within the biomedical 
gaze (Foucault 1973). Questions of agency, risk, suffering, and care are evaluated through 
these frames – and are driven, and ultimately limited, by the biomedical and state apparatus 
within which women receive care. Discussions of prenatal care and forms of 
governmentality (Foucault 1991), elucidated by authors like Lealle Ruhl (1999) on risk and 
care of the self, make important links between prenatal care, public health, and state power. 
But this focus, I argue, while important in formulating sound public policy, must be 
accompanied by a thorough examination of how the pregnant woman is constructed in 
relation to the fetus. 
A woman who is simultaneously pregnant and actively using substances is a unique and 
challenging figure in the world of modern obstetrics. The presence of the ‘addict’ mother has 
accompanied multiple discussions within the field regarding adequate health management 
during pregnancy and effects on the fetus (Finnegan et al. 1972; ACOG 2011). In particular, 
physicians are concerned with avoiding neonatal abstinence syndrome (NAS), which can be 
brought on by a lack of exposure to opiates after delivery or placental abruption6 in the 
setting of active cocaine use. These clinical instances dictate important considerations for 
management options for practitioners in regards to the timing and method of delivery, and 
the care of both the mother and newborn (Niebyl and Simpson 2012). They also inform a 
 
6  ‘Placental abruption’ is defined as the early sloughing of the placenta from the uterine lining. This 
directly impacts the maternal-fetal oxygenation system and causes fetal hypoxia and, if severe enough, 
fetal demise. 
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significant amount of counseling provided to women who are actively using substances 
during their pregnancies. 
The use of urine toxicology screens and women’s admission of active substance use can 
activate the involvement of CPS; due to the presence of CPS, pregnant women actively using 
substances have been found to both fear and curtail their involvement in biomedical care 
(Roberts and Pies 2013; Sharpe 2001; Schempf and Strobino 2009). Adherence and 
toxicology tests, as is well documented in the social-scientific literature (Knight, 
forthcoming; Murphy and Rosenbaum 1998; Sufrin 2014), are both a mechanism of 
enforcing sobriety and judging the deservingness of women in regards to custody over 
children. The work of the National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW), particularly 
Jeanne Flavin and Lynn Paltrow (Flavin 2009; Flavin and Paltrow 2010), has documented the 
effects of prosecution and imprisonment of pregnant women using substances and put forth 
important critiques of misogynistic and unjust state laws. The logic behind the legal 
apparatus focused on pregnancy outcomes lies in the biological relationship between woman 
and fetus, with the ability of chemical intoxicants that pass across the placenta to affect the 
growth and well-being of the fetus. This perceived one-way biological relationship is 
translated into social and moral codes regarding motherhood and fitness for custody; 
ultimately, the MFU is writ into governmental and clinical apparatuses focused on 
promoting the object on the receiving end of any given maternal action: the fetus.7 
However pronatalist the legal system is in America today, the method in which a clinician 
provides prenatal care and counseling to a woman actively using substances does not focus 
solely on the fetus.8 The reorientation to the maternal aspect of obstetrics has been a major 
 
7  In her discussion about the sociopolitical construction of risk, Mary Douglas (1990, 15) 
contextualizes the attribution of risk as primarily involving a concept of justice. Her argument about 
risk as a combination of ancient understandings of taboo and danger, imbued with scientific validity 
(via probability and other forms of statistics), finds itself expressed through concerns about the 
stigma, class, and ‘undesirability’ of certain populations. In this vein, Vania Oka-Smith (2012) writes 
about the construction of bad motherhood in Oaxaca, Mexico; her analysis has, at its heart, the 
attribution of risk by biomedical providers to women deemed as indigenous. Substance abuse in 
pregnancy brings these concepts to the fore with regard to how risk is understood within this 
population as a function of marginality and class. For further discussion on substance use in 
pregnancy, see Fordyce and Maraesa 2012 and Hamilton 2012. 
8  The focus on the fetus within the realm of state law has led to the passage of SB 1391 in Tennessee, 
which criminalizes substance use in pregnancy (McDonagh 2014a, 2014b), leading to the arrest of 
twenty-six-year-old Lacey Weld. She was given more than twelve years in prison for distributing 
methamphetamine; however, the federal judge in the case stated that she was given an additional six 
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component of the field since the mid-1980s, when Allan Rosenfield and Deborah Maine 
(1985) wrote ‘Maternal Mortality – A Neglected Tragedy: Where Is the “M” in MCH?’ in The 
Lancet. Their focus on maternal mortality in developing countries, and their critique of the 
technology-driven aspects of modern obstetrical care, pushed many in both biomedicine and 
public health to realign their focus on the mother. More recently, Mary D’Alton, a 
perinatologist, has argued that an emphasis in clinical care on decreasing both maternal 
morbidity and mortality should be a component of modern obstetrical practice and training 
(D’Alton 2010; D’Alton et al. 2013). This prioritization of the mother moves away from 
analyses devoted solely to neonatal and fetal outcomes, and, as a result, forces clinicians to 
rethink the tripartite relationship of the caregiver-woman-fetus, and to see it as dynamic.9 
For the purposes of this paper, putting the ‘m’ back in ‘maternal-fetal unit’ requires a 
theoretical model that privileges the voice and, most importantly, the actions of the pregnant 
woman as not only tied to the fetus. A woman who is pregnant has a biomedical and social 
trajectory that overlaps with, but does not necessarily adhere to, a particular definition of 
motherhood and health, one that is driven by a highly racialized, classist, and misogynistic 
conception of self-care (see Bridges 2011; Foucault 1988; Ruhl 1999). Clinicians and 
researchers need to account for the aforementioned assumptions if, for nothing else, one is 
to avoid the reductionist model of caring for the woman or the fetus – as if each were 
isolated in their own silo – rather than caring for both at different periods in time. 
Ethnographic studies and philosophical works have already engaged in redefining the MFU, 
particularly in relation to abortion (see Thomas [1971] 2010; Marquis [1989] 2010), genetics 
(see Buchbinder and Timmerman 2011), and surrogacy (Malm [1989] 2010). Most recently, 
Nancy Scheper-Hughes (2012) has examined the role of immunology in regards to 
rethinking maternal well-being and motherhood. By discussing fetal incompatibility from a 
maternal point of view, she creatively begins to question the core components of 
motherhood and maternal love: 
 
years of incarceration due to ‘perceived use’ of the drug captured on surveillance footage while she 
was visibly pregnant (Gwynne 2014). 
9  Epigenomics, or the study of gene regulation and modification, has added to this discussion by 
attempting to account for the impact of environmental and social determinants on health. In 
particular, studies in both public health and the biomedical sciences have focused on the long-term 
effects of the in utero maternal environment on health outcomes. The most well known of these 
discussions, elucidated by David J. P. Barker and colleagues (2007), focuses on the impact of low 
birth weight on cardiovascular risks later in life. However, critics note the focus on the maternal body 
alone as the nidus (site of origin) for improvements in health outcomes as constituting a form of 
somatic determinism, emphasizing the immediate social realm of the mother instead of wider public 
and social policy (Lock 2013; Richardson 2015). 
Medicine Anthropology Theory 
 
 
 
 
35 
If human life at the cellular level is dependent on creative risk, gradual incorporation 
of difference, misrecognition of self, the mother–fetal relationship is founded on the 
suppression of rejection for nine months of pregnancy followed by a dramatic 
‘expulsion’ of that same alien material. How might this understanding affect the way 
we conceptualize ‘maternal thinking’ and the politics of peacemaking after the tiny 
enemy is expulsed, captured, swaddled, and ‘adopted’ by the stranger, the other who 
is also the (m)other? (Scheper-Hughes 2012, 165) 
The important question within the aforementioned analyses, as it relates to substance use, is 
not simply the (de)personification of the fetus or neonate as it relates to maternal behavior 
(Scheper-Hughes 1992; McDonough 2014a, 2014b) or the relationship between mother and 
fetus, but how clinicians understand the complex biological phenomena of the MFU and the 
sociopolitical space that pregnant women inhabit. The conception of the MFU as it relates to 
substance use echoes back to the need for clinical praxis in caring for marginalized and 
vulnerable populations, like pregnant homeless women who are using substances. As a 
physician, this disconnect is felt most importantly in the space of the clinic. Counseling and 
caring for these women well demands a clinician to be savvy about biomedical, legal, social, 
and political structures that impact access to care while simultaneously navigating those 
barriers to provide compassionate and individualized care. Existing alongside the ever-
expanding biosocial framework of pregnancy are the personal experiences of agency, 
violence, and suffering of individual women. How clinicians and substance-using pregnant 
women interact, disperse, collide, and adjust beckons those with one foot in research and the 
other in clinical practice to think about a more fluid conceptualization of the MFU. 
Elaborating on Carla’s narrative illustrates the need not only to reframe the clinician’s gaze 
towards the assemblage of the MFU, but also how public policy can be structured to render 
better care to an often-marginalized and vulnerable population.  
Truth, deservingness, and care of the MFU 
After Carla talked about her current use of heroin and oxycodone, she explained what 
brought her to the hospital. She initially began speaking of her need to withdraw from 
opiates because she had recently begun using them again. When pressed about why she 
relapsed or what conditions precipitated her relapse, she began describing the physical, 
sexual, and emotional violence she experienced over the previous three days. Though she 
initially stated that she was sleeping on her friend’s couch, she confided that over the past 
few days she had been camping underneath an underpass on the outskirts of the city. She 
was attempting to travel into the city, and was hitchhiking on the side of the road. An 
unnamed man, who had promised her that he would drive her into the city, picked her up. 
Carla said he took her to a rural cabin off of the main highway, where she was locked up 
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without food or means of contact for three days. She related stories of being tied up and 
burned with cigarettes, and being injected with some form of narcotic against her will. She 
described the lull, akin to a high, she felt after the injection, and was convinced that the 
abductor had administered some form of an opiate. She also described being sexually 
assaulted multiple times, but would not elaborate as to whether or not he used condoms. She 
displayed scars on both thighs, which she described as remnants of the burns she sustained 
from his cigarettes. Finally, Carla stated that after three days, she was driven to the edge of 
the city and let out on the side of the road. She made her way to our local emergency 
department for evaluation and admission.  
As the medical student on the team, I visited her daily throughout her inpatient stay as part 
of my rounds. Like many clinical encounters, her narrative came in fits and starts, whether 
by describing her story to me from different temporal perspectives or by revealing her signs 
of abuse during daily physical exam procedures. During her initial evaluation, Carla had 
requested a complete physical examination, including a genitourinary exam, and police 
presence in order to file a report; she rescinded both requests almost one hour later. One of 
the resident physicians with whom I worked was called in to help counsel Carla about 
undergoing a post-assault evaluation and filing of police charges. After almost forty minutes 
in the room, she stepped out with a look of confusion on her face. The resident explained 
that she had counseled Carla both about the safety of the mother and the fetus, particularly 
regarding sexually transmitted diseases, and also emphasized that it was her right to file a 
report with police services. The resident stated that she was caught off-guard by Carla’s 
demeanor in the room, which she described as appropriately concerned, but reluctant to ask 
for help. Her attitude, considered peculiar by the care team, was contextualized after a brief 
review of her previous admission: almost two months prior, Carla had been admitted for 
buprenorphine titration and evaluation after an alleged abduction, assault, and torture. She 
had not disclosed these facts to the care team during our initial examination. 
For the care team, Carla’s previous history complicated her current hospitalization and care 
needs. Had she actually ever been abducted, tortured, and assaulted? Thinking, for a 
moment, that the revelation of her past history constituted another instance of violence, 
Carla’s pregnancy and her associated substance abuse could be contextualized in a 
framework of risk. The fact that she was subjected to abduction, rape, and torture twice in 
the past few months attested to her embodied vulnerability as a homeless, pregnant, 
substance-abusing woman. Alternately, if Carla was, in fact, fabricating the details of her 
recent abduction, perhaps she knowingly described such sexual violence in order to gain 
access to housing, food, and opiates from a sympathetic staff. Relying on the stereotypes 
surrounding opiate addiction and homelessness, especially in the context of gender inequity, 
the tropes of violence and pregnancy could engender more sympathy for Carla, and thus 
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give her a better chance of acquiring needed goods and services. This viewpoint, held by 
many of the care staff, aroused feelings of outrage.10 Statements made in workrooms and at 
nursing stations on the ‘danger’ Carla was placing her fetus in, particularly in regards to her 
homelessness and active IV-drug use, were ways of questioning the deservingness of her 
care. One of the ancillary staff questioned why she was taking up a bed when another, 
‘sicker’ patient could use it. Others commented on how ‘demanding’ Carla was, as manifest 
in the frequent need to assess her opiate withdrawal via the clinical opiate withdrawal score 
(COWS) to adequately transition her to methadone. The MFU, in this circumstance, was 
divorced into a binary: on one hand was Carla the homeless, heroin-addicted woman, 
perceived by much of the medical staff as exploiting the hospital for easy access to housing, 
food, and opiates; on the other hand was Carla the pregnant woman, putting her fetus at risk 
for poor outcomes by engaging (willingly or not) in a ‘dangerous’ and violent lifestyle, 
wherein the use of street (as opposed to synthetic) opioids was an integral part of the 
narrative (see Bourgois 2000). The biosocial landscape that framed Carla’s narrative – namely 
how agency and risk are impacted by substance use, homelessness, and a poor social safety 
net – is conveniently left out of the aforementioned false dichotomy. 
Carla’s care on the inpatient ward was ultimately successful; her pregnancy continued 
without complication, and she was safely transitioned to methadone. Upon leaving, she 
promised our care staff that she would follow up both at the local methadone dispensary and 
in prenatal care. Later in the year, after rotating off service, I was told by both the OB/GYN 
attending physicians who were staffing a prenatal clinic devoted to caring for women who 
were using substances during pregnancy that Carla never returned for follow-up care. 
Looking back, I ask: how did the structuring of narrative (intake history) and the staff’s ideas 
about the MFU, expressed in terms of deservingness, contribute to the type of care Carla 
received? I contend that reconstructing Carla’s admission through the guise of Byron Good’s 
discussion of subjective utilitarianism and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari’s concept of 
becoming can create an ethics of accompaniment, and that this can be used to advocate for 
patients like Carla in both the clinical and policy environment. 
 
10  Reviewing the case among psychiatrists, family medicine physicians, psychologists, and OB/GYNs 
almost three years after the incident, many individuals described this very same phenomenon. One 
physician exclaimed, ‘Well, Carla may know us better than we know ourselves!’ indicating that Carla 
may have known how to elicit a sympathetic response from the staff in order to fulfill her material 
and medical needs. Another physician described a ‘scarcity model for compassion’, meaning that 
many in the biomedical field require a dramatic show of suffering in order to create a compassionate 
connection with a patient. For further discussion regarding the demonstration of the suffering body 
and the provision of care in the American context, see Crane, Quirk, and van der Straten 2002. 
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Subjective utilitarianism and becoming in the clinical encounter 
Carla’s narrative seats maternal agency as a nidus for discussions on moral deservingness and 
the biomedical analysis of risk for the MFU. Maternal agency has famously been described in 
the anthropology of reproduction, particularly as it relates to engaging with reproductive 
technologies. Rayna Rapp (2000, 2011) describes ‘moral pioneering’, or how women make 
sense of new reproductive technologies using their experience in a variety of domains – 
social, gender, generational, and religious: 
Women and their supporters may be forced to confront and opt in or out of new and 
quite invasive medical technologies, but they do not do so on “virgin territory.” 
Rather, they use available and long-standing resources to reason their way through a 
fraught and seemingly radically new situation. In a sense, they become “moral 
pioneers” by using comfortable resources to decipher uncomfortable situations, a 
form of constrained but real agency. (2011, 11)11  
Tine Gammeltoft (2007), in her analysis of prenatal diagnosis of fetal malformations in 
Vietnam, reorients the notion of agency to include biomedical and familial structures. 
Rooting her critique in a response to Rapp’s work, she argues that moral pioneering is 
indicative of a particularly Western form of the subject. For Gammeltoft, it is the 
relationships an individual has with family and biomedical structures, rather than an 
individual’s moral compass, that impacts the decision to continue or terminate a pregnancy. 
In both circumstances, maternal agency is constructed in the realm of the care of the self 
(Foucault 1988; Ruhl 1999), with a heavy reliance on subjective utilitarianism. Though a 
primarily economic term, Byron Good (1994, 47) critiques subjective utilitarianism in the 
context of patient care-seeking behavior: ‘The analytic conjunction of the utilitarian actor, 
instrumental beliefs that organize the rational calculus of care-seeking, and ethnomedical 
systems as the sum of strategic actions is uncomfortably consonant with neo-classical 
economic theories of the utilitarian actor, the market place, and the economic system as 
precipitate of value-maximizing strategies’. 
 
11  However, this relationship is not merely a one-way street, as Rapp suggests in her analysis; both the 
lives of reproductive technologies and those of the individuals that use (or desire to use) them are 
contextualized and impacted by each other. In the context of my argument, this becomes important 
for understanding not only agency, but also how assemblages of care create new trajectories for 
pregnant, substance-using women. 
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In subjective utilitarianism, the maternal subject exists in an unhindered world of choice; 
moreover, the rationality employed by a given individual is rooted primarily in a cost-benefit 
analysis. Concepts like moral pioneering, situated within the complex social and political 
relationships forged by a given pregnant woman, are stripped from any construction of 
maternal agency. This ‘impoverished conception of human symboling, of meaning made 
servant to the biosciences and to practical reason’, as Good (1994, 47) puts it, undergirds the 
discussion of Carla’s deservingness for care. Her admission to the hospital, then, would be 
seen as a utilitarian act driven by a desire for food, clothing, and easy access to opiates, with 
the potential for engaging in prenatal care for her fetus. This reductionist view disengages 
Carla from a wide variety of other motivating and competing factors that might drive her 
into care, such as her proximity and potential engagement with violence, her desire to care 
for herself and her fetus, and her overall concerns for her safety and well-being. All of the 
aforementioned factors are expressions of wider socio-structural inequalities, linked with 
homelessness, substance use, and the status of women within marginalized social groups (see 
Bourgois, Prince, and Moss 2004; Bourgois and Schonberg 2009). 
How, then, to conceptualize the MFU, both bereft of subjective utilitarianism and with the 
room to account for the social and political construction of the unit itself? I argue that we 
can start this arduous task with Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming, which is rooted 
in classical cultural anthropology. Contrasting Victor Turner’s discussion of liminality along 
with Edmund Leach’s writings on Kachin sorcery, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 247) write of 
an ambiguous ‘politics of becoming’: 
There is an entire politics of becomings-animal, as well as a politics of sorcery, which 
is elaborated in assemblages that are neither that of the family nor of religion nor of 
the State. Instead, they express minoritarian groups, or groups that are oppressed, 
prohibited, in revolt, or always on the fringe of recognized institutions, groups all the 
more secret for being extrinsic, in other words, anomic. 
Most recently, João Biehl and Peter Locke (2010, 317) describe ‘an anthropology of 
becoming’ that focuses on ‘those individual and collective struggles to come to terms with 
events and intolerable conditions and to shake loose, to whatever degree possible, from 
determinants and definitions’. Basing such a theory on the importance of ethnography at the 
margins of life, Biehl and Locke (2010, 336) seek to combine other social theories with a 
sense of flux: 
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We work to understand the macro without reducing or bounding the micro, 
accounting for the effect of structural violence, power, expertise, and the 
embodiment of sociological forces while still crediting the against-the-odds openness 
and ambiguity of individual lives and interpersonal dynamics—upholding, that is, the 
value of people’s drive to singularize out of populations and categories, to take 
themselves out of the stream of history and social destiny.  
The importance of becoming in caring for pregnant women who are actively using 
substances has to do with the heuristic use of a patient’s medical history. This primarily is 
related to challenging preconceived notions of the will and causality, and questioning the 
assumption that a patient’s history can be used to advocate for, and thereby change the 
social and political suffering of, a given individual. In the clinical encounter, patient history, 
especially one charged with as much political, legal, and social weight as a pregnant 
substance-using woman, is neither monolithic nor archeological (see Holmes and Ponte 
2011). The moral and legal construction of the pregnant, substance-using woman tightly 
constrains both the disclosure of substance use by the patient and the use of such history by 
the physician in the medical record and in the monitoring of substance use through urine 
toxicology screens. Therefore, patient history is constantly changing as a relationship with a 
patient grows and as old understandings of illness and health are re-analyzed in different 
time periods. Substance use during pregnancy entails not just the obvious legal ramifications 
(affecting custody of children, and, depending on the state law, leading to criminal 
prosecution12), but also how the patient history is constructed in line with different 
apparatuses of control.  
I contend that the ideas of Deleuze and Guattari allow us to envision an ethics of 
accompaniment, one that allows patient histories to be re-analyzed as cartography (see Biehl 
2013). Similar to a rhizome (Deleuze and Guattari 1987), the primordial construction of 
history leaves one not with a deterministic, predestined view of what will or what did 
happen, but simply beginnings without end. They write, ‘History is always written from the 
sedentary point of view. … What is lacking is … the opposite of a history’ (1987, 23). This 
statement has, at its heart, a reorientation of cause and effect, particularly as it relates to how 
patients present their illness and the means by which they are treated. The notion of 
causality, described by Enlightenment philosopher David Hume (2007), is the root of all 
matters of fact, or statements that individuals take for granted. Matters of fact are inferred by 
experience. For example, if a stone or piece of metal is lifted into the air and then released, it 
will fall time and again. However, Hume (2007, 31–32) asks a more radical question about 
 
12  See McDonough 2014a, 2014b; Gwynne 2014. 
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matters of fact: if we ‘consider the matter a priori, is there anything we discover in this 
situation which can beget the idea of a downward, rather than an upward, or any other 
motion, in the stone or metal?’ Accordingly, is there anything inherent in the MFU or its 
activity (in other words, substance use) that dictates a certain outcome, a particular clinical or 
social course? 
The idea that there may be unlimited possible outcomes for women actively using substances 
while pregnant does not discount the neurobiological construction of addiction. Though the 
concept of addiction was redefined in the twentieth century as a chronic, relapsing brain 
disease (see Campbell 2013), how this idea maps onto the everyday care and understanding 
of substance users is varied. Indeed, as E. Summerson Carr (2013) describes in his evaluation 
of motivational interviewing, the rescripting of the addict’s language from denial (itself a 
component of addiction) to self-transparency begs important questions about how the 
biomedical fields are conceptualizing addiction. More specifically, as J. T. Braslow (2013) 
indicates in his review of the history of recovery, addiction is constructed as a reflection of 
neoliberal ideologies about self-care and individual drive within the confines of the 
pharmaceutical industry. Therefore there is an inherent tension between neurobiological 
determinism and individual choice in the modern-day concept of the addict that offers the 
possibility for different, creative futures for subjects. 
Applying the theory of becoming to substance use, Deleuze and Guattari devote a few pages 
of A Thousand Plateaus to discussing addiction and its ethical ground. For both philosophers, 
the use of drugs and the assemblage such drug use creates boils down to ‘the hit and the 
dose, the dealer’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 284). The highly individualized focus of 
substance use ultimately is characterized by an empty body, unable to be primed for 
connection with other assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 285). Deleuze and 
Guattari’s description of the addict’s body, as bereft of any social connection, has come 
under critique by both philosophers and anthropologists. In Peta Malins’s (2004, 96) reading 
of A Thousand Plateaus, the end-point of drug use should not amount to simply pre-judging 
the assemblage created by a substance user and the substance, but should be seen as an event 
in itself – a moment when different actors come together to create a specific ethics, 
spatiality, and above all, subjectification. Malins (2004, 90) writes: 
A body does not inject drugs in a social vacuum: it may become subject to the 
physical intervention of the law, the coercive force of medicine, the reductive 
classification of psychiatry, the intervening categorization of public health, the 
disapproving gaze of moral reasoning, the restrictions of spatial planning. … It may 
suddenly find itself a ‘risky’ body; a ‘dirty’ or ‘polluted’ or ‘criminal’ body.  
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The multiplicities provided in different assemblages allows for a new form of agency to take 
hold, and with it, a new form of ethics. In this framework, good and bad are not simply 
linked to a moral action (the act of using a substance or not using a substance), but to the 
possibility of connecting with other assemblages.13 An anthropology of the good, namely 
how ‘people organize their personal and collective lives in order to foster what they think of 
as good’ (Robbins 2013, 457), can be seen as a natural corollary to Malins’s interpretation. As 
opposed to a pre-conceived good/bad (or moral/immoral) dichotomy, Robbins (2013, 457) 
calls for an ‘imaginatively conceived’ good that allows subjects to act in a world that does not 
necessarily correlate to what is empirically derived. In this manner, the creativity at work in 
structuring an anthropology of the good is akin to what Deleuze and Guattari call for 
regarding the notion of becoming – an unending sense of possibilities, connections, and 
futures.  
An ethics of accompaniment – Carla’s narrative reimagined 
Deleuze and Guattari attempt to break the rigidity of macro theory by focusing on a 
rhizomatic, undifferentiated concept of the individual through their discussions of 
becoming. However, their analyses do little to connect the potential of an assemblage in 
becoming with the potential of an individual using substances. Critics of these texts and 
recent research in both substance use and reproductive health point out a new direction for 
those involved in clinical care; I propose that by incorporating an ethics of accompaniment 
into encounters with pregnant women using substances, clinicians and researchers can begin 
to reconcile the issues surrounding agency and the MFU.  
An ethics of accompaniment redefines what ‘cause’ and ‘time’ actually mean in the clinical 
encounter. For many in the biomedical field, a given patient’s actions are deemed good or 
bad (from a health perspective) based on the construction of a deontological categorical 
imperative – an action whose philosophical basis is good in itself, rather than good because 
 
13  Jarrett Zigon’s ethnographic study of drug rehabilitation in Russia poses unique questions regarding 
the creation of moral and ethical assemblages within seemingly unchanging structures. Examining 
treatment for HIV-positive individuals who are intravenous drug users, he posits that the site of 
rehabilitation within the Russian Orthodox Church does not necessarily institute a ‘totalizing moral 
discourse’ (Zigon 2011). Instead, the sociohistorical and political changes that have undergirded 
Russian life create new assemblages within the shells of deterritorialized spaces. Echoing R. K. 
Merton (1936), Zigon argues that the unintended and unexpected moral and ethical consequences of 
this program are felt at the level of recovering addicts’ subjectification – in particular, the institution 
of a conflicting dynamic of neoliberal self-care and orthodox penance. 
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it is a means to something else (see Kant 2002, 31).14 Using substances chronically in 
pregnancy has multiple neonatal and maternal risks, including neonatal abstinence syndrome 
(NAS), fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), fetal growth restriction, mental disabilities, placental 
abruption, and preterm labor (ACOG 2011; Niebyl and Simpson 2012, 155–57).15 For an 
individual woman, active substance use has well-known documented risks: possible liver 
failure, contraction of infectious diseases like HIV and hepatitis, endocarditis, permanent 
neurological damage, and death (Maeda et al. 2014; Niebyl and Simpson 2012). Therefore, 
from a clinical perspective, there is an ethical obligation to inform and help women who are 
actively using substances to detoxify or move towards replacement therapies, such as 
methadone or buprenorphine in the case of opiate use.16  
Indeed, from the clinical perspective, the trouble with the categorical imperative has little to 
do with Carla’s narrative. Though some health care providers attempted to use a risk-based 
counseling methodology in light of Carla’s disclosure of active substance use and recent 
sexual violence, the persistence of deontological thinking became highlighted when her 
actions were interpreted beyond the immediate physician-patient encounter – when care 
providers looked to her history to qualify her present and to assess her future. The 
discussion surrounding deservingness of care is one small example of how the categorical 
imperative can be used to morally judge vulnerable, marginalized individuals without any 
attention to sociopolitical context. Judging the rightness or wrongness of substance use in 
pregnancy is the very type of thinking that informs pronatalist and disciplinary policy today 
in the United States, in both state legislatures and federal policy. The dynamics and 
longitudinal aspects of biomedical care, so crucial for understanding a patient’s actions and 
barriers, are lost in the translation to public health policy and criminal law.  
 
14  As opposed to a hypothetical imperative, defined as the practical necessity of a possible action (for 
example, ‘I take your food because I am hungry), the categorical imperative does not treat human 
beings as means to an end. The act itself is a mirror of rule-based action (deontology), and is 
summarized by Kant (2002, 38) in this way: ‘So act as if the maxim of your action were to become 
through your will a universal law of nature’. 
15  Neibyl and Simpson (2012) note that while marijuana has no significant teratogenic (developmentally 
disruptive) effect on the fetus, data is limited in this regard. Moreover, the authors discuss the 
confounding factors of polysubstance abuse, sociostructural inequality, and poor health access in 
regards to analyses of neonatal outcomes, particularly in relation to cocaine use. 
16  For a discussion regarding the ethics of maintenance substances, please see Bourgois 2000, Lovell 
2013, and Saris 2013. 
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In the United States today, seventeen state governments actively prosecute pregnant 
substance-using women for child abuse (Guttmacher Institute 2013; Child Welfare 2012; 
McDonough 2014a); but, as seen in states like Tennessee and Texas, limited access to 
treatment and maintenance means that prosecution ultimately commits pregnant or newly 
delivered women to (re)incorporation into the prison-carceral system with little hope for 
support or help (see Wacquant 2001). The reduction of maternal substance use to child 
abuse, itself rife with contradictory and complex definitions (see Scheper-Hughes 1992, 340–
343 and 446–431; Finerman 1995), wipes out the complex biosocial interactions of the 
MFU, subsequently focusing the breadth of intervention on punishment rather than 
adequate care and support of the MFU across space and time. Physicians are locked into this 
framework when it comes to provision of and access to care for substance-using pregnant 
women. Self, agency, and structural inequality are bracketed and left unaddressed by such 
policies and such clinical responses. 
For Deleuze and Guattari, individual actions themselves are not the core components of 
concern; the focus is rather the impact of connectivity, the 
territorialization/deterritorialization of new assemblages, and the creation of new methods 
of becoming. The obligation to inform and counsel women who are actively using 
substances must always be couched within the assemblage of biomedical care, and 
specifically how it can improve connections and beget new forms of becoming. Put another 
way, exposure to substances by the MFU is a present problem with the potential for future 
change. Maternal-fetal outcomes in the case of substance use cannot be predefined; allowing 
for a sense of flux, of the unknown, is the backbone of modern clinical care. Rather than 
focusing on an individual’s action – Does a woman use substances? – the question must be: 
‘How does a woman’s substance use help or hinder her attachment to systems of support 
and care?’ The role of the clinician must be to accompany the patient in her history and her 
present, in order to tease out this complex biosocial reality and tailor the response in a way 
that maximizes the possibility for care both immediately and in the long term.  
Since the primary issue of concern is not an individual’s singular action, but the web of 
interconnectivity and the patient’s ability to create new assemblages, clinicians and patients 
must walk together in order to maximize these possibilities. Counseling and care provided 
within the prenatal and postpartum arenas must engage women in care not only for the 
benefit of their pregnancy, but for their health and social well-being overall. Our 
understanding of agency within structurally violent situations, then, can move away from 
notions of subjective utilitarianism. Doing so in this case, Carla’s narrative loses the 
murkiness surrounding the validity of her claims of sexual assault and abduction. The 
disclosure of such violence, though disturbing on both a clinical and moral level, is no longer 
couched in the guise of whether or not she is using the staff for access to methadone and 
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shelter. The fact that Carla showed up to care at all becomes the primary motivator for how 
the team can best serve her health and social needs in both the short and long term. 
With an ethics of accompaniment, a woman’s continued use of substances, whether new or 
relapsing, is not subject to a moral dichotomy of good and bad actions or to a crude, 
reductive neurobiology. Rather, the clinician is able to evaluate her agency in the context of 
the assemblage that substance use and pregnancy creates in relation to biomedical care, the 
legal system, and the prison-carceral complex. An ethics of accompaniment, then, is a 
method of solidarity, one that forces clinicians to realize both the inequality present in these 
complex encounters and biomedicine’s responsibility to agitate for sociopolitical change 
(Earnest et al. 2010; Farmer 2003; Scheper-Hughes 1995). By structuring the clinical 
encounter with Carla to promote connectivity within her community by helping her reach 
out to different methods of care – through social workers, Narcotics Anonymous, or other 
support groups – rather than focusing solely on the cessation of her substance use and the 
truthfulness of her claims, clinicians can extend one arm in an ethics of accompaniment. 
Furthermore, by using stories of women like Carla to lobby against policy and law that 
simultaneously targets pregnant women while gutting adequate social provisions for care, 
care providers and researchers can enter into the advocacy realm, another way to practice an 
ethics of accompaniment, thereby influencing the biosocial realm that the MFU inhabits.  
In summary, authoritative knowledge is redirected as the clinician works with a substance-
using pregnant woman; care is not solely directed toward immediate maternal-fetal health 
outcomes, but also toward increasing the ability of the woman to ground herself in a wider 
structural net and build towards sustained and reproducible changes in maternal and fetal 
trajectories. This is not to discredit the known risks of using substances in pregnancy, but 
rather, like harm reduction modeling, to clearly state that in environments where suffering 
and structural violence shape daily life, a woman’s everyday decision making may be 
impacted by more than her fetus’s health. This is putting the ‘m’ back in the maternal-fetal 
unit, pushing the clinician to align him or herself with the assemblage of the MFU, rather 
than the woman or her fetus alone. Choices made by women actively using substances are 
not those of a flawed subjective utilitarianism in regards to health-related behavior, but are 
rather tied to a particular time and place, a particular assemblage. Becoming, then, allows for 
the possibility of change and a new trajectory with different conceptions of agency and 
effect. The MFU is allowed to traverse through a given biosocial space without presupposed 
notions of its beginning and end. The cartography is undefined, yet clinician and patient 
move forward, together, constantly changing and creating new methods of care. 
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